'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Reviewing Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform
Why does Türkiye say the world is bigger than five? A review of UN Security Council reform models, the veto debate and Ankara's case for rotation.
Why It Matters
Türkiye says 'the world is bigger than five' because the Security Council's five permanent members were fixed by the 1945 postwar settlement, yet the Council acts on behalf of all 193 UN member states. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly used the phrase at the UN General Assembly to argue that the veto and the Council's composition erode its legitimacy and effectiveness. Ankara favours broader representation, rotation and limits on the veto rather than adding new permanent members. Other camps, notably the G4 and the African Union, argue the opposite on permanent seats. This review sets out the structure, the reform models and each side's case, with positions attributed to their own statements.
Background
How the Council is built
The Security Council has 15 members. Under Article 23 of the UN Charter, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States are permanent. Ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms and cannot be immediately re-elected. Under Article 27, procedural decisions need nine affirmative votes, and substantive decisions need nine votes including the concurring votes of the permanent members. That requirement is the 'veto'. Under Article 24, the Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security and acts on behalf of the whole membership.
| Feature | Current arrangement |
|---|---|
| Total members | 15 |
| Permanent members | 5 (China, France, Russia, UK, US) |
| Veto power | Held only by the five permanent members |
| Elected members | 10, two-year terms, no immediate re-election |
| Informal regional distribution of elected seats | Africa 3, Asia-Pacific 2, Eastern Europe 1, Latin America and the Caribbean 2, Western European and Others 2 (an Arab seat alternates between the African and Asia-Pacific groups) |
| Decision threshold | 9 votes, with no permanent member voting against on substantive matters |
A short chronology of reform
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1945 | UN Charter adopted; five permanent members named in Article 23 |
| 1963–1965 | General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII) enlarges the Council from 11 to 15; the amendment takes effect in 1965 |
| 1993 | General Assembly creates an Open-Ended Working Group on Council reform |
| 2005 | World Summit supports early reform; competing G4 and Uniting for Consensus draft resolutions are tabled but not put to a vote; the African Union adopts the Ezulwini Consensus |
| 2008–2009 | General Assembly decision 62/557 launches intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) |
| 2022 | General Assembly Resolution 76/262 requires a General Assembly debate after any veto is cast |
| 2024 | The Pact for the Future, adopted in September, reaffirms the commitment to Council reform, including better representation of Africa |
The Council has been enlarged only once. Amending the Charter requires a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members including all five permanent members (Article 108). In practice, every permanent member holds a veto over reform itself.
The five negotiating clusters
The IGN process is organized around five issues: categories of membership, the question of the veto, regional representation, the size of an enlarged Council and its working methods, and the Council–General Assembly relationship. Because the negotiations proceed on the principle that 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed', the process has produced successive 'elements papers' and co-chairs' texts, but no negotiated draft that member states have adopted.
Key Players & Positions
The permanent members
The five do not speak with one voice, and each speaks for itself in General Assembly debates.
- France and the United Kingdom have said they support enlarging both categories of membership, including a permanent presence for Africa, and back the G4 states' aspirations. France, together with Mexico, has promoted a political declaration on voluntary veto restraint in cases of mass atrocities.
- The United States has in recent years voiced support for expanding both permanent and non-permanent seats, including representation for Africa and for Latin America and the Caribbean, while indicating it does not support extending the veto to new members.
- Russia has said it supports a greater role for Asian, African and Latin American countries, and has rejected proposals to curtail or abolish the veto.
- China has said the Council should give more space to developing countries, especially African states, while stressing that reform should reflect broad consensus rather than being forced through.
The G4
Brazil, Germany, India and Japan seek permanent seats for themselves. Their 2005 draft called for six new permanent members, including two from Africa, and four additional non-permanent members. The G4 argues that a Council of 1945 cannot credibly reflect today's distribution of population, economic weight and contributions to the UN. Its drafts have accepted a deferral of the new members' veto while the question is reviewed.
The African Union
The 2005 Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration call for two permanent seats with full prerogatives, including the veto, and five non-permanent seats for Africa. The African position is that Africa, where most Council agenda items are concentrated, is the region most under-represented, and it has described this as a 'historical injustice'.
Uniting for Consensus (UfC)
Uniting for Consensus, sometimes called the 'Coffee Club', includes Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Türkiye and others. Its members say that creating new permanent seats would entrench a new tier of privileged states and deepen regional rivalries. Instead, the group has proposed a larger Council with additional elected seats, longer terms and the possibility of immediate re-election, so that every member is periodically accountable to the wider membership. The UfC maintains that this model is the only one with a realistic chance of the broad support the Charter's amendment rule requires.
Other groupings
The L.69 group of developing countries and the CARICOM states have backed expansion in both categories and increased representation for the Global South. The ACT group (Accountability, Coherence and Transparency) focuses on working methods and has promoted a Code of Conduct urging Council members to refrain from the veto in situations of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Objections to the elected-seats model
Critics of the UfC approach make serious points. They argue that longer-term elected seats do not change the veto and may leave the most powerful decision-making privileges untouched. They say that without permanent membership, states with major financial, military or peacekeeping contributions would still have no continuity. Africa's representatives have said the model does not meet their demand for permanent status. Some analysts also note that, because the UfC is partly defined by rivalries with individual G4 candidates, its position can look more like a blocking coalition than a reform plan. UfC members reply that preventing new permanent seats is itself a reform principle, not an obstruction.
Türkiye's Position
Ankara's doctrine is summarized in the phrase Dünya beşten büyüktür ('The world is bigger than five'), used by President Erdoğan in his General Assembly addresses since at least 2014. It is also set out in Turkish statements during the IGN and in the Foreign Ministry's published positions on UN reform.
- The Council must be more representative. According to the Presidency's published transcripts of his addresses to the General Assembly, President Erdoğan argues that a world of 193 members cannot be governed by five states whose privileges date from 1945. Ankara points to Article 2(1) of the Charter, which is founded on the sovereign equality of all members, and Article 24(1), under which the Council acts on their behalf.
- Rotation, not new permanent seats. In Turkish statements at the UN and in the UfC, Türkiye has said it opposes creating new permanent seats, which it argues would multiply privilege rather than reduce it. It supports a larger Council with more seats filled by regional rotation and elected for longer terms, so that every region and every member has a real chance to serve. Türkiye itself has served as an elected member (1951–52, 1954–55, 1961 and 2009–10).
- The veto should be limited. President Erdoğan has said the veto allows one state to block action even when a large majority supports it. Ankara argues that the veto, as currently used, has paralysed the Council in major crises, and its public statements support restraint and greater accountability for veto use. It has pointed to the repeated blocking of Gaza ceasefire texts as an example, and to Resolution 76/262, which requires the General Assembly to meet after a veto, as a step in the right direction.
- A legitimacy and effectiveness argument. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, reform should make the Council more democratic, transparent, accountable and effective. Ankara links this to its wider record in mediation and humanitarian diplomacy, including the Istanbul and Antalya tracks and its Palestine policy (see What Makes Mediation Work? and Türkiye and Palestine: the 1988 recognition and two-state position).
- Reform must come through consensus. Turkish statements stress that any amendment must be agreed through the General Assembly's intergovernmental process and cannot be imposed by a few. The Article 108 ratification requirement is, in Ankara's reading, a reason to build the broadest possible agreement, not to bypass it.
The same attachment to strict, even-handed application of rules appears in Ankara's approach to the 1936 Montreux Convention, discussed in Montreux Article 19 in Practice. Readers can verify Turkish positions in the Presidency's transcripts, the Foreign Ministry's UN-reform pages and Türkiye's statements in the IGN, and compare our approach to sourcing in the Editorial Principles.
Source Comparison
| Question | Western and international commentary | Turkish primary sources | UN documents |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cause of paralysis | Often focuses on great-power rivalry and specific vetoes (Ukraine, Gaza, Syria) | Presents the veto and the 1945 structure as the underlying problem | Resolution 76/262 recognizes the need for accountability after a veto |
| Preferred remedy | Many think-tank pieces favour adding permanent seats for major powers and Africa | Prefers rotation, a larger elected component and veto limits | IGN texts record all models without choosing among them |
| The UfC | Sometimes portrayed as a blocking coalition | Described as a principled coalition for democratic reform | UfC papers set out its model |
| Feasibility | Frequently described as improbable due to Article 108 | Treats consensus-building as the only legitimate path | Charter Articles 108 and 109 set the amendment rules |
| Role of Türkiye | Sometimes read as rhetoric tied to the Gaza war or Türkiye's wider politics | Presented as a consistent position since at least 2014 | Turkish interventions recorded in IGN and General Assembly verbatim records |
The comparison shows that most disagreement is not about facts but about remedy. Both sides accept the veto and composition problems; they differ on whether permanence or rotation better serves legitimacy. Readers should note that Turkish sources advocate a policy position, and verify it against the primary UN records. For wider coverage of the same doctrine, see the sister analyses from Polity Review, Region Scope, Political Ledger and, on the climate angle, The Political Anatomy.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- Veto: the effect of Article 27(3), under which a negative vote by a permanent member blocks a substantive Council decision.
- Article 108: the Charter provision requiring two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all permanent members, for any amendment.
- IGN (intergovernmental negotiations): the General Assembly process on Council reform, running since 2009 under decision 62/557.
- G4: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, who seek permanent seats.
- Ezulwini Consensus: the African Union's 2005 common position on Council reform.
- Uniting for Consensus (UfC): the group, including Türkiye, that opposes new permanent seats.
- Resolution 76/262: the 2022 General Assembly resolution mandating a debate after any veto.
For a broader view of Diplo Review's mission and approach, see About Diplo Review and the Reader FAQ. A further sister perspective on Türkiye's wider diplomacy is available from Record of Nations.
Diplo Review presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues it covers, grounded in treaty texts, UN documents, and Ottoman and Turkish state archives. Primary sources are cited and linked wherever possible so that readers can verify claims and form their own judgments.
Published by the Diplo Review Editorial Team.
Frequently asked questions
Why does Türkiye say the world is bigger than five?
President Erdoğan uses the phrase to argue that five permanent members, chosen in 1945, cannot legitimately decide matters of peace and security for 193 states. Ankara says the veto and the fixed composition reduce the Council's representativeness and effectiveness. It favours broader representation, rotation and limits on the veto.
Does Türkiye want a permanent seat on the Security Council?
No. As a member of Uniting for Consensus, Türkiye opposes creating new permanent seats for any state, arguing this would simply add new privileged members. It supports a larger Council with more seats filled by rotation and longer terms, so that all regions and members can serve.
What are the main Security Council reform models?
The G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) seek new permanent seats for themselves and for Africa. The African Union demands two permanent seats with veto and five non-permanent seats. Uniting for Consensus proposes more elected seats with longer terms and possible re-election, and no new permanent members.
Why has the Security Council not been reformed since 1965?
Amending the Charter requires two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members including all five permanent members under Article 108. States also disagree over permanent seats, the veto and regional allocation, and the intergovernmental negotiations treat the package as indivisible. No text has yet reached a vote.
Can the veto be limited without amending the Charter?
Partly. General Assembly Resolution 76/262 (2022) requires a General Assembly debate after any veto, which adds accountability without changing Article 27. Voluntary veto-restraint initiatives, such as the French–Mexican declaration and the ACT group's Code of Conduct, rely on political commitments rather than legal change.
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