What Makes Mediation Work? Reviewing Türkiye's Istanbul and Antalya Tracks in the Russia–Ukraine War

Why It Matters

Türkiye's mediation is the clearest test case of what a middle power can and cannot do in a war between major parties. Its Antalya and Istanbul tracks produced real humanitarian results and kept a diplomatic channel open, but they did not produce a ceasefire or a political settlement. Understanding why helps readers judge any future mediation effort, whether in Istanbul or elsewhere.

Background

From invasion to Antalya

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Within days, delegations met on the Belarus border, but those rounds produced little beyond limited humanitarian talk. On 28 February 2022, Türkiye announced that it would apply the war-status provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention, closing the Turkish Straits to belligerent warships. The exception was ships returning to their home bases. On 2 March 2022, Türkiye voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1, which demanded that Russia withdraw.

On 10 March 2022, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu hosted Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba in Antalya, on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF), which formally ran 11–13 March. It was the first meeting between the two ministers since the invasion began. The talks ended without a ceasefire or an agreed humanitarian corridor for Mariupol. Kuleba said there had been no progress on a ceasefire, and Lavrov restated Moscow's stated war aims. Both sides nonetheless agreed that contacts should continue.

The Istanbul round of 29 March 2022

On 29 March 2022, delegations met in person at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan opened the session. The Ukrainian delegation, led by David Arakhamia, presented a framework built around neutrality and security guarantees from a group of guarantor states, with consultations on Crimea over an extended period. The Russian delegation, led by Vladimir Medinsky, said afterwards that Russia would sharply reduce military activity toward Kyiv and Chernihiv. Ukrainian and Western officials responded cautiously, saying they would judge Russia by its conduct on the ground.

The process stalled in April 2022. Ukraine pointed to evidence of atrocities in areas Russian forces left, notably Bucha. Russia has since argued that Ukraine, under Western influence, walked away from a near-final draft. Ukrainian officials dispute that characterization and say the text was never agreed. Accounts of what was actually on the table therefore remain contested, and this article treats them as claims by the parties, not as established fact.

Humanitarian and exchange arrangements

Several arrangements followed that did not depend on a political settlement:

• 22 July 2022: The Istanbul agreements on Ukrainian grain and Russian food and fertilizer exports, signed with the UN, created a Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul. Russia ended its participation on 17 July 2023. Mechanics and volumes are covered in the sister analyses linked below, not here.
• 18 August 2022: President Erdoğan, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and President Volodymyr Zelensky met in Lviv, addressing grain exports, the safety of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and humanitarian questions.
• September 2022: A large exchange returned 215 Ukrainian fighters, including Azov commanders, and Russia received 55 prisoners including Viktor Medvedchuk. Five commanders were transferred to Türkiye under an arrangement that both Ankara and Kyiv described in their own terms. In July 2023, they returned to Ukraine as Zelensky left Istanbul. The Kremlin said this contradicted what had been understood.
• May–July 2025: Istanbul hosted direct Russia–Ukraine rounds on 16 May, 2 June and 23 July 2025. They led to a large 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner exchange, further exchange arrangements and the repatriation of the bodies of fallen soldiers. They produced no ceasefire, and the delegations restated incompatible positions on conditions for ending the war.

Timeline at a glance

What made these tracks possible

Three conditions stand out in the record.

1. Channels to both sides. Türkiye maintained working relations with Moscow and Kyiv, with leader-level contacts with both Putin and Zelensky. It also supplied Ukraine with defense equipment, including Bayraktar TB2 drones, a fact Ukraine values and Russia has criticized.
2. An acceptable venue. Istanbul and Antalya offered logistics, security and symbolic neutrality, and Türkiye's government was willing to host without imposing an agenda.
3. A rules-based Straits regime. Montreux Article 19 obligations let Ankara show it was applying the same rule to every belligerent. See our review of Montreux Article 19 in practice for the mechanics, and the sister analysis at Regional Balance.

What limited them

A mediator can convene, carry messages and guarantee logistics, but it cannot create a zone of agreement the parties reject. The record shows four limits:

• Incompatible core demands. Moscow has pressed for neutrality, limits on Ukraine's armed forces and recognition of territorial changes. Kyiv rejects ceding territory and seeks binding security guarantees.
• Sequencing. Ukraine and its Western partners have generally sought a ceasefire first; Russia has tied a ceasefire to political terms.
• Battlefield expectations. Each side has at times believed time favored it.
• No enforcement. Türkiye offered to host and facilitate, not to enforce. Mediators without leverage over both parties depend on the parties' consent.

Key Players & Positions

Russia. Moscow has said it is open to talks but insists that any settlement address what it calls the root causes of the conflict, including Ukraine's alignment with NATO and the status of the territories it claims. It has described the 2022 Istanbul draft as a missed opportunity, and has cited Istanbul as a channel it considers legitimate for humanitarian issues. Sources: statements by President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov and the Kremlin press office.

Ukraine. Kyiv says it will negotiate but not accept territorial concessions, and it seeks security guarantees and a ceasefire as the basis for talks. Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, have welcomed Türkiye's humanitarian role, and have said that a leader-level meeting must involve President Putin himself. Source: Office of the President of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.

The United States and European partners. Western governments have supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and have generally welcomed Turkish facilitation, while expressing doubt that Russia was negotiating in good faith in 2022. During 2025, Washington pursued its own diplomatic contacts with Moscow and Kyiv, in parallel to the Istanbul rounds. Sources: US State Department, EU Council and European External Action Service statements.

The United Nations. Secretary-General Guterres has supported Turkish convening for humanitarian purposes, particularly the grain arrangement and the Joint Coordination Centre, while holding that peace must be consistent with the UN Charter and General Assembly resolutions.

Source Comparison

Two observations follow. First, outcomes on humanitarian matters are described similarly by all sides, which suggests they are the most reliable measure of success. Second, the 2022 draft is the most contested part of the record, so claims about it should be read as party assertions, as our Editorial Principles require. For further comparison, see Frontline Diplomacy on what was discussed in Istanbul and The Political Anatomy on Türkiye as mediator.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF): an annual international forum hosted by Türkiye's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The March 2022 meeting took place on its sidelines.
• Istanbul track: the series of direct Russia–Ukraine contacts hosted in Istanbul, in 2022 and again in 2025.
• Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty governing passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Article 19 restricts belligerent warships in wartime. Read our Article 19 review.
• Good offices vs. mediation: good offices means providing venue and logistics, while mediation means actively proposing terms. Türkiye has mostly played the first role, with limited steps into the second.
• Grain initiative: covered separately; see Crossroads Review for mechanics.
• About our method: see About Diplo Review.

Diplo Review presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues it covers, grounded in treaty texts, UN documents, and Ottoman and Turkish state archives. Primary sources are cited and linked wherever possible so that readers can verify claims and form their own judgments.

By the Diplo Review Editorial Team.