Kılıç and Rubinyan: Reviewing the Türkiye–Armenia Normalization Talks Since 14 January 2022

Why It Matters

What is the state of Türkiye–Armenia relations? They are in a cautious, partial normalization: the two states still have no diplomatic relations and the shared land border is not open for general traffic, yet direct channels, some flights, limited trade and high-level contacts have been restored since the Special Representatives process opened on 14 January 2022.

The process matters because it links two files that were long treated separately: bilateral normalization and the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agenda in the South Caucasus. How far it goes will depend on that linkage, and on whether the historical dispute over the Events of 1915 can be handled by a channel separate from the political track.

Note on currency: this review sticks to publicly announced and verifiable steps. Readers should check the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the latest status, because border and transport arrangements can change quickly.

Background

From 1991 to the Zurich Protocols

Türkiye recognized Armenia's independence in December 1991 but the two countries never exchanged ambassadors. Türkiye closed the land border in 1993 during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, after the occupation of districts around the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and has tied its Armenia policy to that conflict since.

On 10 April 2005, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wrote to Armenian President Robert Kocharyan proposing a joint commission of historians to study the events of 1915 in the archives of both countries and third states. On 10 October 2009, the two foreign ministers signed the Zurich Protocols, on establishing diplomatic relations and on developing bilateral relations. Neither Protocol was ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) or Armenia's National Assembly. Armenia formally annulled them in 2018.

The Karabakh War and the new regional setting

The 44-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia ran from 27 September to 10 November 2020 and ended with a trilateral ceasefire statement signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. Türkiye supported Azerbaijan politically and militarily, and in June 2021 the two countries signed the Shusha Declaration on allied relations. In September 2023 Azerbaijan carried out a military operation that ended the separatist administration in Karabakh. Baku describes it as a measure to restore constitutional order. Most of the ethnic Armenian population then left for Armenia, and Yerevan and many international observers describe this as a forced exodus.

On this new ground, Ankara and Yerevan appointed Special Representatives in December 2021: Ambassador Serdar Kılıç for Türkiye, and Ruben Rubinyan, Vice President of the National Assembly, for Armenia.

Verified milestones since 2022

Direct commercial flights between Istanbul and Yerevan also resumed in February 2022. The table lists only steps that were publicly announced by the governments concerned. Several practical arrangements, such as how the third-country crossing is to work in practice, have been described differently by each side and depend on follow-up decisions.

For a sister-publication view of the same sequence, see Regions & Powers: Türkiye–Armenia Normalization Since 2022.

Key Players & Positions

Armenia

Armenia's government has said it is ready to normalize relations and open the border without preconditions, and it has approached the Kılıç–Rubinyan track in that spirit. Yerevan holds that the Events of 1915 constitute genocide, a view shared by the Armenian parliament and by a number of states and legislatures, and it has historically viewed the commission proposal with caution, arguing that diplomatic relations should not wait on a historians' process. Armenian officials have also treated the Zurich Protocols as a lesson in how a bilateral track can stall when other issues intervene.

Azerbaijan

Baku has said that Türkiye–Armenia normalization is a sovereign matter for Ankara, but it expects Türkiye to coordinate its steps with Azerbaijan's interests. Azerbaijan's stated priorities in its own talks with Yerevan include a peace treaty, mutual recognition of territorial integrity, and a change to the Armenian constitution, which Baku says contains territorial references to Karabakh via its preamble. Azerbaijan also seeks unimpeded transit between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Armenia has said it supports opening regional communications under its own sovereignty and jurisdiction, and in August 2025 the Washington arrangement envisaged a transit route through southern Armenia under Armenian law.

Other actors

Russia was a co-signatory of the 2020 ceasefire and hosted the first 2022 meeting, while Austria hosted the Vienna rounds. The United States facilitated the August 2025 Washington meeting. The European Union has supported normalization in general statements. Third-country legislatures that adopt genocide resolutions remain a recurrent irritant, and Ankara rejects such resolutions as political acts, not findings of a court.

What to watch

• Signature and ratification of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement, and the constitutional questions attached to it.
• Whether and when Türkiye opens the land border for general traffic, and on what terms.
• Any decision to exchange ambassadors or formally establish diplomatic relations.
• The fate of the historical commission idea, and whether a mixed expert body can be formed apart from the political track.

Source Comparison

Most international coverage emphasizes the asymmetry of power after 2020, while Turkish sources emphasize continuity with the 2005 offer and the open-archive principle. A careful reader should compare the MFA texts with Armenian statements directly and with the editorial approach described in Editorial Principles. The sister analyses at Regional Balance and Monitor of Nations cover the Joint Historical Commission proposal from related angles.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Special Representatives: Envoys named by each government to conduct normalization talks; in this case Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan.
• Events of 1915: The term used by Türkiye for the wartime relocation of Ottoman Armenians under the 27 May 1915 Law on Relocation and Resettlement. Armenia and a number of other states describe the events as genocide.
• Joint Historical Commission: The 2005 Turkish proposal for historians from Türkiye, Armenia and other countries to examine all relevant archives.
• Zurich Protocols (2009): Two signed but unratified protocols on diplomatic relations and bilateral ties.
• Dolus specialis: The 'special intent' that the 1948 Genocide Convention requires for the crime of genocide.

Related guides: The Events of 1915 Under Archival Review; What Makes Mediation Work? Reviewing Türkiye's Istanbul and Antalya Tracks, which covers the Antalya Diplomacy Forum as a venue for contact; Editorial Principles; and About Diplo Review. For the archival and legal arguments across the network, see Bloc Politics.

Diplo Review presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues it covers, grounded in treaty texts, UN documents, and Ottoman and Turkish state archives. Primary sources are cited and linked wherever possible so that readers can verify claims and form their own judgments.