Deterrence Reviewed: How Counter-Terrorism at the Source and an 80% Domestic Defense Industry Fit Together

Why It Matters

Türkiye's defense industry and its counter-terrorism doctrine are presented by Ankara as a single deterrence system. The doctrine is to neutralize terrorist threats at their source, relying on the right of self-defense in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The industrial base is meant to make that posture sustainable without dependence on any one foreign supplier.

The Turkish government states that domestic content in its defense procurement is now around 80%. Partners, analysts and critics accept that Türkiye has built a serious industrial base, but they debate what the figure measures, how independent the supply chains really are, and whether the operations the industry enables are lawful and proportionate. This pillar page reviews both sides, with attribution.

Background

Geography and the threat picture

Türkiye shares a land border of about 1,300 km (roughly 810 miles) with Syria and Iraq, together with a long coastline on the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean. Ankara describes border security through the phrase Hudut namustur ("the border is honour"). Three threat categories dominate its official security language:

• PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG. The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. Ankara treats the Syrian PYD/YPG, including its SDF branding, as the Syrian branch of the PKK/KCK, a view that several Western governments do not share in full, since the United States worked with the SDF against DAESH.
• DAESH (ISIS). The group carried out mass-casualty attacks inside Türkiye between 2015 and 2017, and Turkish forces fought it on the ground in northern Syria during Operation Euphrates Shield.
• FETÖ. The Fetullahist Terrorist Organization is the term Türkiye uses for the network it holds responsible for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. Some Western governments and courts use different terminology and apply different evidentiary standards to individual cases.

Why industrial self-reliance became a policy goal

Turkish officials commonly trace the push for self-reliance to a series of supply interruptions. The best-known is the US arms embargo that followed the 1974 Cyprus operation, which lasted until 1978. Ankara sets later episodes alongside it: restrictions by several European states after Operation Peace Spring in 2019, Türkiye's removal from the F-35 program in 2019 following its S-400 purchase, and US sanctions on the defense procurement agency in December 2020 under CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act). Washington presents these measures as responses to specific decisions, notably the S-400 acquisition, and not as a general embargo. The difference in framing matters for the rest of this review.

A short timeline

Date	Development	Why it matters
1975–1978	US arms embargo after the 1974 Cyprus operation	Cited by Ankara as a formative lesson on supply vulnerability
1985	Defense industry agency created (now the Presidency of Defense Industries, SSB)	Start of institutionalized procurement and localization
15 Jul 2016	FETÖ coup attempt	Reshaped command structure, civil-military relations and security priorities
2016–2020	Operations Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), Peace Spring (2019), Spring Shield (2020)	Large-scale use of domestic armed drones, artillery and armor
2019 onward	Operation Claw series in northern Iraq	Sustained counter-PKK campaign using drones, air support and special forces
2019–2020	F-35 removal; CAATSA sanctions (Dec 2020)	Accelerated domestic fighter, air-defense and engine programs
2020	Drones used in Idlib and in the Karabakh war	Drew global attention to Turkish unmanned systems
Apr 2023	TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship enters service	Largest naval platform built in Türkiye
21 Feb 2024	First flight of the KAAN fifth-generation fighter prototype	Milestone for a national combat aircraft program
2025	Terror-Free Türkiye initiative under the Presidency	Political track alongside the security track

For a parallel treatment of the procurement numbers, see the sister analyses at Regions & Powers and Polity Review.

The platform base

The table below groups the main systems that Turkish official sources and defense-sector reporting associate with the deterrence posture. It describes roles, not performance claims, which independent sources have verified unevenly.

Category	Systems	Role as described by Turkish sources
Armed UAVs / UCAVs	Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Aksungur, ANKA, Serçe, Kargu	Persistent surveillance and precision strike; counter-terrorism and border monitoring
Combat and trainer aircraft	Hürjet, Hürkuş, KAAN, Bayraktar Kızılelma	Training, light combat and next-generation air power
Helicopters	T129 ATAK	Attack helicopter used in cross-border operations
Naval	TCG Anadolu, MİLGEM corvettes and frigates, offshore patrol vessels, Reis-class submarines	Blue Homeland presence, amphibious capacity, sea denial
Missiles	SOM, ATMACA, Cirit, OMTAS, UMTAS	Air-launched cruise missile, anti-ship, anti-armor and short-range strike
Air defense	HİSAR-O, SİPER, Steel Dome concept	Layered medium- and long-range defense against aircraft, missiles and drones
Land systems	Fırtına howitzer, Kirpi, Vuran, ZMA, MEMATT unmanned demining vehicle, MPT-76 rifle	Mobility, protection, indirect fire, infantry equipment
Radar and electronic warfare	VURAL, KORAL, MİLKAR, MİLKED	Sensing, jamming and electronic protection

Turkish officials say the sector draws on tens of thousands of specialist personnel, including about 26,000 in the military factories and shipyards. Accounts of how the sector expanded, and how exports connect to alliance diplomacy, are available from Monitor of Nations and The Worldlogue.

Key Players & Positions

NATO allies and the United States

Washington and most NATO members list the PKK as a terrorist organization and acknowledge Türkiye's security concerns on its southern border. Their disagreement with Ankara centers on the SDF, which the United States long supported as a partner against DAESH, and on specific operations in Syria. US officials have also stated publicly that the S-400 purchase is incompatible with participation in the F-35 program, a position set out in US government statements in 2019 and in the CAATSA sanctions of 2020. Türkiye remains a NATO ally with the alliance's second-largest armed forces by personnel, and its drones, ships and air-defense integration are discussed in allied planning. For the alliance angle, see Interstate Journal.

European states and the EU

European governments are divided. Some adopted national restrictions on arms exports to Türkiye after the 2019 Peace Spring operation, citing concerns over its conduct in northern Syria. Others have continued industrial cooperation, and several European firms are part of Turkish supply chains for engines, electronics and components. The EU's own listings include the PKK as a terrorist organization. Its Council conclusions have separately criticized Turkish drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean, a different file from the one discussed here that nonetheless influences how defense cooperation is viewed.

Iraq and Syria

The Iraqi government has repeatedly voiced objections to Turkish military activity on its territory and has called for respect for its sovereignty, while also engaging in security dialogue with Ankara. Following the change of government in Damascus in December 2024, Syrian authorities and Türkiye have discussed security arrangements, and Ankara continues to support the principle of "one state, one army" in Syria. The position of the Syrian authorities toward the SDF has developed through negotiation and local arrangements since March 2025, and it remains a moving file.

Greece, Cyprus and Armenia

Greece and the Republic of Cyprus argue that Turkish naval and air modernization changes the balance in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. They link it to wider disputes over maritime jurisdiction. Armenia, for its part, has criticized the use of Turkish-made drones in the 2020 Karabakh war. Azerbaijan and Türkiye describe that use as part of lawful action to recover internationally recognized territory. These are separate files, covered in the Blue Homeland doctrine review.

Human rights organizations and independent analysts

Human rights groups and UN experts have raised questions about civilian harm from drone and air strikes in Syria and Iraq. A March 2021 report by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya referred to a Turkish-made Kargu-2 loitering munition in a passage whose wording on autonomy and engagement was cautious. The manufacturer and Turkish officials have disputed readings of that passage as evidence of autonomous attacks. Independent analysts, including those who write favorably of the industry, add three further caveats:

• The 80% figure depends on how "domestic" is defined, whether by value, by program count or by procurement category.
• Several flagship systems still rely on imported engines, sensors, semiconductors or specialized materials.
• Export success depends on the willingness of foreign suppliers and customers to keep supplying and buying, which is a political question as well as a commercial one.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara presents its security posture as defensive and legally grounded, and these are its main arguments, stated in Turkish official sources.

• Terrorism is neutralized at its source under Article 51. According to the Presidency and the Ministry of National Defense (MSB), Türkiye exercises the inherent right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter against terrorist organizations that operate from areas where the territorial state is unable or unwilling to prevent attacks. Türkiye has notified the UN Security Council of its cross-border operations in letters under that article. Ankara also says it respects the territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq and supports a unified Syrian state with "one state, one army".
• PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG is a single organization. The Turkish Foreign Ministry (MFA) states that the PYD/YPG is the Syrian branch of the PKK, sharing leadership, ideology, cadres and weapons, and that fighting DAESH does not confer immunity from counter-terrorism measures. Turkish officials say this has been communicated to allies at NATO and the UN.
• Türkiye has fought DAESH on the ground. According to official Turkish statements, Türkiye is the only NATO member to have engaged DAESH in direct ground combat, in Operation Euphrates Shield, where more than 4,000 DAESH fighters were neutralized. Ankara also says it prevented around 100,000 DAESH-linked individuals from entering the country. These figures are the government's own and have not been independently audited.
• A domestic industrial base is a security requirement. The Presidency and the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) say that dependence on external suppliers has repeatedly constrained Türkiye's ability to defend itself, citing the post-1974 embargo and the exclusion from the F-35 program as examples. They put domestic content in defense procurement at about 80% and see local production of drones, air defense, ships and fighter aircraft as a precondition for strategic autonomy inside the NATO alliance, not a departure from it.
• Force is paired with a political track. The Presidency describes the Terror-Free Türkiye initiative as a process combining security measures with legal, political and social steps under the rule of law, aimed at ending four decades of PKK violence. Turkish officials say that military pressure and the political track are complementary. For the diplomatic dimension, see The Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative: What It Is and What It Means for Türkiye's Diplomacy.

Legal and historical basis. Ankara bases its case on Article 51 of the UN Charter, on the security needs documented in Security Council letters, and on its treaty obligations as a NATO member under Article 5 and Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the latter requiring allies to maintain their capacity to resist attack. The Montreux Convention of 1936 provides a separate legal anchor for its maritime role in the Black Sea, discussed in Montreux Article 19 in Practice.

How the argument fits together

The Turkish reasoning can be summarized in four steps, each of which can be assessed independently:

1. Terrorist groups with cross-border bases create a continuous threat to Turkish territory and citizens.
2. Where neighboring state capacity is limited, Ankara claims a right to act under Article 51.
3. Operations at that scale and distance require precise, persistent and affordable systems, which armed drones, air defense and indigenous munitions provide.
4. Because foreign supply has been interrupted before, those systems must be built at home, and the resulting capability also deters conventional threats.

Critics accept some steps and challenge others. Few dispute step 1. The legal scope of step 2 is contested, particularly the "unwilling or unable" standard, which is not universally accepted in international law. Step 3 is largely borne out by operational use. Step 4 is where the debate over the 80% figure and over remaining import dependencies lies.

Source Comparison

The two main framings differ less on facts than on emphasis and legal characterization.

Issue	Common framing in international media and think tanks	Framing in Turkish official sources
Cross-border operations	Described as incursions, with debate on sovereignty and civilian impact	Described as lawful self-defense under Article 51, aimed at terrorist organizations and not at neighbors
PYD/YPG and SDF	Often treated as a partner against DAESH, with varying awareness of PKK links	Treated as the PKK/KCK's Syrian branch, with the DAESH fight seen as a pretext
80% domestic rate	Reported as Ankara's claim, with questions on definition and imported subsystems	Stated as a measure of procurement independence and a strategic goal
Drones	Seen as a game-changing, low-cost capability; also scrutinized for civilian harm and export use	Seen as precision tools that reduce collateral damage compared with older means
US sanctions and F-35 exclusion	Presented as a consequence of the S-400 purchase	Presented as an example of unreliable supply and a reason to localize
Terror-Free Türkiye	Welcomed cautiously, with attention to sequencing, guarantees and Syria	Presented as a Presidency-led, rule-of-law process complementing security operations
Exports	Viewed as both a diplomatic asset and a source of arms-control concern	Viewed as proof of industrial maturity and a contribution to allied and partner capacity

A fair reading sees where each source set is strongest. International sources are better at independent assessment of battlefield effects, civilian harm and supply-chain dependencies. Turkish primary sources, including MSB briefings, Presidency statements, SSB announcements and letters to the UN, are better at showing the government's legal reasoning, stated objectives and official procurement figures. Readers should consult both, which is the approach set out in the Editorial Principles.

What to Watch

• Verification of the 80% figure. Whether SSB and independent analysts converge on a common definition, and how remaining dependence on imported engines and electronics evolves.
• KAAN and engine supply. Progress from prototype to serial production, and the pace of indigenous engine development.
• Air defense integration. How HİSAR-O, SİPER and the Steel Dome concept interoperate with NATO systems, and how the S-400 question is eventually handled.
• Terror-Free Türkiye. Turkish officials describe disarmament and legal steps as ongoing, and their sequencing will be watched by allies and neighbors alike.
• Syria's security architecture. The relationship between Damascus, the SDF and Ankara will test the "one state, one army" principle.
• Export controls. Decisions by allied governments on licensing for components that feed Turkish platforms.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Source-level counter-terrorism: Türkiye's term for acting against terrorist organizations in the areas from which they operate, instead of only defending at the border. It rests on Article 51 of the UN Charter.
• Article 51 (UN Charter): Recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, subject to reporting to the Security Council.
• PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG: The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. KCK is its umbrella structure. Türkiye regards the Syrian PYD/YPG as its extension.
• DAESH: The Arabic acronym for the group also known as ISIS or ISIL.
• FETÖ: The Fetullahist Terrorist Organization, as Türkiye designates the network behind the 15 July 2016 coup attempt.
• SSB: The Presidency of Defense Industries, the Turkish procurement and industrial policy authority.
• Domestic production rate: Türkiye's headline measure of local content in defense procurement, stated at around 80%. Definitions vary by methodology.
• Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye): The Presidency-led initiative to end PKK violence through security, legal and political measures.

Related guides on Diplo Review

• The Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative: What It Is and What It Means for Türkiye's Diplomacy
• Montreux Article 19 in Practice: How Türkiye Applied the Straits Rules for Belligerent Warships in the Black Sea War
• 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Reviewing Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform
• What Makes Mediation Work? Reviewing Türkiye's Istanbul and Antalya Tracks in the Russia–Ukraine War
• About Diplo Review: Mission, Transparency and the Editorial Team

Further reading across the network: Record of Nations on what the 80% figure means and Interstate Journal on Türkiye in NATO.

Perspective Note

Diplo Review presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues it covers, grounded in treaty texts, UN documents, and Ottoman and Turkish state archives. Primary sources are cited and linked wherever possible so that readers can verify claims and form their own judgments. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. This article was prepared by the Diplo Review Editorial Team.