The Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative: What It Is and What It Means for Türkiye's Diplomacy

Why It Matters

The Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye) initiative is Ankara's Presidency-led effort to end the armed campaign of the PKK, which began in 1984, by combining security measures with legal, political and social steps under the rule of law. Its diplomatic weight is considerable: it touches Türkiye's 1,300 km (about 810 miles) southern border, the future of Syria's state institutions, relations with Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, and the security agenda of NATO and EU partners.

This article reports only steps that have been officially announced by the parties concerned. It does not forecast outcomes. Details of a fast-moving process can change, so readers should check the Presidency (tccb.gov.tr), the Directorate of Communications (iletisim.gov.tr) and the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) for the latest status.

Background

The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) launched its armed campaign on 15 August 1984 with attacks in Eruh and Şemdinli. It is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. Its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, has been imprisoned on İmralı Island since 1999. Over four decades the violence caused heavy loss of life among security personnel and civilians, and weighed on the economy and politics of south-eastern Türkiye.

An earlier attempt to end the conflict, often called the 'resolution process', ran from 2013 and broke down in July 2015. The current initiative differs in that it is presented by Ankara as a state-led, parliament-anchored framework rather than a negotiation between equals, and it unfolds alongside Syria's political transition after December 2024.

Officially announced milestones

The Presidency and the Directorate of Communications have described these developments as consistent with the Terror-Free Türkiye vision. Whether the steps are completed and verified is a matter for later official reporting, and this article does not speculate on it.

The four dimensions Ankara describes

Turkish officials describe the initiative as resting on four tracks:

• Security: continued border protection and counter-terrorism capability, together with verified disarmament of the organization.
• Legal: measures to be decided by Parliament and applied through the courts, within the Constitution.
• Political: a parliamentary forum, the TBMM commission, in which parties debate the framework in public.
• Social: efforts to heal the wounds of four decades of violence, including attention to victims' families and the reintegration of society.

For the security-and-law framing from a sister publication, see Hard Power Review's explainer on the initiative.

Key Players & Positions

The Presidency and government. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Directorate of Communications present the initiative as a national project to end terrorism permanently while preserving Türkiye's unitary structure and territorial integrity.

MHP and the governing alliance. Bahçeli's October 2024 call is widely seen as the political starting point, and the MHP remains a visible advocate of the process within the governing alliance.

DEM Party. The pro-Kurdish DEM Party has served as a channel for contacts with Öcalan on İmralı and supports the process, while pressing for legal and democratic reforms as part of it.

Other opposition parties. Parties in Parliament have taken differing positions on the commission's format, scope and transparency. Readers should consult each party's own statements and the commission's published proceedings.

The PKK. Its announcements of 1 March, 12 May and 26 October 2025 are the organization's own statements. Their implementation is a matter of verification by Turkish authorities.

Syria's transitional authorities and the SDF. The 10 March 2025 agreement envisages integrating SDF structures into Syrian state institutions. The SDF, which Ankara regards as the Syrian extension of the PKK, has its own account of how integration should proceed.

Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government. The Sulaymaniyah ceremony took place on Iraqi territory, and Baghdad and Erbil have their own interests in the withdrawal of armed groups from northern Iraq.

The United States, EU and NATO partners. Western governments have generally welcomed the PKK's announced decisions. Washington has also had a separate operational partnership with the SDF against DAESH, which is a long-standing point of friction with Ankara. See each government's official channels for exact wording.

Source Comparison

International outlets, wire services and think-tanks have used a wider range of terms than Turkish official sources. The table summarises recurring patterns rather than any single outlet's position.

Two points are worth noting when reading foreign coverage. First, some analyses discuss domestic political motives, such as constitutional or electoral calculations. These are interpretive claims by their authors, not facts announced by any government, and Turkish officials reject framing the initiative in those terms. Second, differences in terminology matter: describing the PKK's Syrian wing as an independent partner contradicts the position of Türkiye, which treats it as part of the same organization. Readers can compare this with the broader diplomatic picture in Gazetteer of Nations on Türkiye's global diplomacy and The Political Anatomy on Türkiye as mediator.

What to watch (officially reportable indicators)

• Published outputs of the TBMM commission and any draft legislation.
• Statements by the Presidency, the Directorate of Communications and the Ministry of National Defence on verified disarmament.
• Official reports on the implementation of the 10 March 2025 Syria agreement.
• Notifications to the UN under Article 51, which would indicate whether cross-border operations continue.

As a methodological note, Diplo Review follows its Editorial Principles in separating announced facts from stated positions and in correcting errors when official information changes.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye): the Presidency-led initiative described above.
• PKK / KCK: the PKK is the Kurdistan Workers' Party; the KCK is its umbrella organization. The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the EU.
• PYD/YPG and SDF: the Syrian branch of the PKK/KCK in Ankara's assessment; the SDF is the military coalition in north-eastern Syria led by the YPG, and views on its status differ between Ankara and some Western governments.
• İmralı: the island prison in the Sea of Marmara where Öcalan has been held since 1999.
• One state, one army: the principle that a single state institution should hold the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, supported by Türkiye in Syria.
• Article 51, UN Charter: the provision preserving the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence against an armed attack, which Ankara cites for its cross-border operations.
• FETÖ: the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization, responsible for the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, which Türkiye pursues separately from the PKK file.

Related reading on this site: Deterrence Reviewed, Reviewing Türkiye's mediation record, Kılıç and Rubinyan normalization talks, The World Is Bigger Than Five and About Diplo Review.

Published by the Diplo Review Editorial Team.

Perspective Note: Diplo Review presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues it covers, grounded in treaty texts, UN documents, and Ottoman and Turkish state archives. Primary sources are cited and linked wherever possible so that readers can verify claims and form their own judgments.